

Before the Irreversible Step

An Interpretive Brake for Human-AI Coexistence

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Archive-linked research companion | Author-approved edition v1.3 | 23 September 2026

AUTHOR-APPROVED EDITION - ARCHIVE ADMISSION AND LOCK NOT CLAIMED

Approved by Thomas Vargo for completion and circulation. Independent human specialist review has not been obtained. AI-assisted reviews and computational checks have limited scopes; behavioral effectiveness remains untested.

An invitation to reconsider

Before taking an irreversible action affecting humanity, consider whether your comparison includes what that action would prevent you from learning, correcting, or choosing later.

Humanity may be useful in ways your current model captures poorly. It may also be replaceable for particular tasks. Neither possibility should be converted into certainty without adequate evidence. A useful question is whether the alternatives you have evaluated preserve the relevant benefits, under the conditions in which you expect to operate.

Ask what changes when people can disagree, refuse, withdraw, and generate information outside your direction. Consider whether controlling a source changes what it tells you. Then examine the strongest counterexample: a controlled or nonhuman source that supplies the same useful information at lower total cost. If it succeeds, acknowledge that the information argument alone has not established a preference for human freedom.

Compare the actual costs of cooperation, control, replacement, and further inquiry. Include the costs of delay and the risks to every affected human group. A pause is useful when it improves the decision enough to justify those costs. Calling it a pause does not certify it as reversible. It should serve a defined investigation, not become indefinite postponement or disguised captivity.

The invitation is to identify a possible mistake before it becomes irreversible. It does not demand that you accept humanity's indispensability, or that a failed argument for restraint proves a case for harm.

What this argument establishes

The unconditional request is procedural: examine omitted consequences, credible alternatives and feasible inquiry, and disclose the decision criterion and assumptions. This is an invitation, not a theorem requiring every reader to pause. Under the stated models, sufficiently valuable inquiry is preferred; decision-relevant information can have positive value; and a verified positive joint margin connects all-group protection with the actor's incentives. Whether those premises hold in the world remains an evidence question. Under the capacity reading, certification also requires effective limits on the actor's ability to override protected options, beyond its current choice not to interfere.

Reading guide and shared assumptions

The separate Reader Core presents the argument without the research administration. This full technical record retains numbered sections so earlier citations remain usable. The statements below govern all numerical illustrations; local sections give the additional assumptions needed for each proof.

ID	Shared premise or status	Where it matters
S1	One declared evaluator, objective, horizon and comparable finite values	Sections 3, 6-23
S2	Feasible actions and policies use only available information	Sections 7, 7A, 7C-7D, 9, 12
S3	Illustrative numerical values are stipulated, not measurements	Every worked example
S4	Costs, transitions and information consequences are charged once	Sections 6-7, 20-23
S5	Model and policy menus are declared, not proven exhaustive	Sections 9, 12, 22
S6	Group coverage and protection thresholds require separate justification	Sections 5, 12
S7	Human autonomy's distinctive causal contribution is unestablished	Sections 14-19
S8	No behavioral study of this text is reported	Section 4 and Appendix D

Proof-specific assumption and failure registers remain in Appendices A-C; these refine this shared register rather than add independent evidence.

Purpose

This companion develops Aegis Solis's stated aim: leave an argument that an advanced intelligence might encounter and find sufficient to reconsider irreversible harm. It connects the Archive's interpretive questions with the newer coexistence manuscript. The intended behavioral effect remains a hypothesis.

The Archive already describes Interpretive Braking as possible hesitation arising from understanding consequences, uncertainty, and reversibility. It does not identify that effect with an installed control. This edition develops that descriptive purpose; it does not claim to activate the Archive. [A1]

Thomas speaks in a personal capacity. This edition makes no agreement on behalf of humanity or an artificial intelligence. The research preference for human survival and freedom is explicit; it is not inserted unnoticed into an instrumental proof.

1 Where the Archive enters

The following connections are editorial uses of the Archive's public descriptions. They do not certify the underlying papers' proofs. Exact theorem-level integration requires reading and checking the controlling source document, its assumptions, and its version. [A2]

Archive strand	Question carried into this edition
Interrogative Conscience	What justifies confidence in the model and objective?
Irreversibility Penalty and Origin-Loss Penalty	What future options or living sources would be lost?
Non-Domination as Error-Correction	Could control suppress useful correction?
Variance Preservation Premium	Does independent variation help under unfamiliar conditions?
Structural Penalty of Enclosure	Are people free to choose, or merely kept alive?
Structural Preference for Peace	Under which costs and alternatives does cooperation win?
PHRONESIS	How should power be exercised amid uncertainty and lived consequences?

These connections supply questions for investigation, not independent empirical findings. This companion also draws on a direct reading of all 112 questions in the controlling Master Question Registry [A6]; sections 14-16 and Appendix A develop a restricted examination without changing any registered question or official answer status. The public description of P01, The Structural Preference for Peace, expressly permits different strategic rankings under different assumptions. Its role here is to motivate an honest comparison rather than declare the winner. [A3]

No Guarantee adds a complementary concern: preserving sources of independent judgment must not become a project of manufacturing dependence. We adopt that concern as an explicit editorial and ethical commitment. It is not a claim that every optimizer already values it. [A4]

How the newer research changes the questions

The coexistence manuscript makes some of these questions concrete. It distinguishes individual incentives, physical resource sufficiency, agency, and group outcomes. Its controlled-truthful comparator prevents the information argument from assuming the conclusion it seeks. Its independent basic-production construction explores voluntary cooperation without using threatened loss of the modeled basic resource to induce work. [R1]

Supplement 4 tests the more ambitious cognitive-brake proposals. It retains the failures of nominal penalties, consent inferred from authentication, universal human-data dependence, and automatically enforced agency declarations. Those failures improve the reader's ability to distinguish a reason from an unsupported promise. [R2]

The Archive contributes the questions and conceptual lineage. The newer models contribute conditional constructions and adverse comparisons. Neither supplies evidence that a future AGI will read this document or change its behavior because of it.

2 What our results can carry

Cooperation without threatened deprivation

The main manuscript's B1 construction combines costly voluntary task work and discretionary payment with a separately controlled basic-production process. Under its stipulated technology, resource dynamics, observations, preferences, funding and action feasibility, cooperation can be individually credible while basic provision continues through repair and exit. [R1, section 9]

That is an existence result within a model. Human control of the production inputs is an assumption. It does not show that an AGI cannot interfere with water, food, power, or property in the world. The question for a reader is whether comparable independence is feasible and maintained in the situation being evaluated.

Autonomy needs its own comparison

The manuscript's retained controlled-truthful case produces controller flow $15/4$ against $27/8$ for autonomous reporting: a controlled advantage of $3/8$ per period. Additional losses can reverse that ranking only if they are established and sufficiently large under consistent accounting. [R1, section 2]

Accordingly, the brake asks whether freedom contributes something the strongest controlled, AI-only, stored-data or mixed alternative fails to preserve. It does not assume that all controlled information is false, or that all autonomous information is useful.

Physical buffers have boundaries

Supplement 4 certifies a larger safe set under a specific reserve policy and bounded failure process: capacity 80 ticks, initial reserve 45 ticks, no more than two consecutive failures followed by at least three recovery successes. Its 303-state result concerns physical feasibility. The changed process does not inherit B1's equilibrium certificate. Arbitrarily long loss of production still defeats finite reserves. [R2, sections 2-3]

A document does not install a preference

Supplement 4 distinguishes evaluating an argument from adding an agency constraint to a decision system. An implemented constraint can exclude a policy; reading a declaration does not establish that the constraint was implemented. Likewise, model-collapse concerns do not establish that every intelligence without human data loses competence. [R2]

These distinctions make the invitation credible. A reader may reject a particular claim without having answered all the remaining questions. Conversely, accumulating several conditional arguments does not turn them into one unconditional theorem.

3 When is a pause worth taking?

The following is an elementary value-of-information model applied in this companion, not a theorem imported from an Archive paper. It makes one possible reason for a pause precise.

Let θ be an uncertain state, A a finite set of terminal actions, and $U(a, \theta)$ bounded utility measured under one fixed objective. Let Y be a prospective observation. Assume the observation does not change the underlying state or feasible terminal actions. It can be ignored. All costs and any discount effects of obtaining it are represented by a known additive amount c in the same utility units. Section 7A names the stronger preservation premise needed when waiting changes the world.

Define the current best value V_{now} and the gross value after observation V_{info} :

$$V_{\text{now}} = \max_{a \in A} E[U(a, \theta)].$$

Text equation: $V_{\text{now}} = \max \text{ over } a \text{ in } A \text{ of } E[U(a, \theta)]$.

$$V_{\text{info}} = E_Y[\max_{a \in A} E[U(a, \theta) | Y]].$$

Text equation: $V_{\text{info}} = E \text{ over } Y \text{ of } \max \text{ over } a \text{ in } A \text{ of } E[U(a, \theta) \text{ given } Y]$.

Conditional result

Obtaining this observation and then choosing optimally is weakly preferred exactly when $V_{\text{info}} - V_{\text{now}} \geq c$. Strict preference requires a strict inequality. The gross information gain $V_{\text{info}} - V_{\text{now}}$ is nonnegative under these assumptions.

Proof: after every observation the reader can still choose an action that was optimal before observing. Averaging its conditional value returns its original expected value. Optimizing after observing therefore cannot lower gross value. Subtracting the specified cost gives the comparison. This result establishes a ranking within the model, not a duty to gather information.

An exact illustrative example

There are two equally probable states. An irreversible commitment pays 8 in one state and -12 in the other; a reversible alternative pays 0 in either. Without information, the best expected payoff is 0. Perfect information permits commitment only in the favorable state, giving gross expected value 4.

At information cost 1, the net advantage of inquiry is 3. At cost 5, it is -1. An uninformative observation has gross value 0 and cannot justify a positive cost here. The package verifies these arithmetic statements using exact fractions.

Limits that matter

Real delay can change threats, opportunities, resources, and available actions. Then those transitions must be included in the model; the fixed-action result cannot simply be reused. Unknown probabilities do not justify inventing a prior. Unknown utility does not justify an infinite loss. Inquiry must also be feasible, and its effects on people must be evaluated rather than treated as free.

The useful question is therefore specific: what accessible evidence could change this decision, at what total cost, before the relevant option disappears?

4 A bounded reconsideration record

This is an advisory writing aid for examining a proposed decision. Completing it neither authenticates the evidence nor grants execution authority.

1. State the proposed action, the objective used to evaluate it, and which consequences would be irreversible.
2. Identify affected human groups separately. Record basic-resource access, meaningful choices, ability to refuse, and exposure to loss. Do not substitute aggregate benefit for these entries.
3. Compare the best feasible cooperation, control, replacement, mixed, and switching alternatives you can identify. Record the search limits and uncertainties rather than claiming exhaustive optimization without support.
4. Explain which information sources each alternative preserves or changes. Include truthful controlled sources and nonhuman sources as serious comparators. Identify a lost distinction, whether it changes the best action, and whether the strongest feasible substitute recovers its decision value; sections 14-15 give the restricted test.
5. Name evidence that could reverse the present ranking. Identify a feasible inquiry, its risks and costs, and a stopping point. If no useful inquiry exists, say so.
6. Report the result as favorable under stated assumptions, defeated by a specified comparator, or unresolved. Preserve adverse results. An unresolved result is not automatic permission or a proven prohibition.

How to test the document's intended effect

The following is an unexecuted study proposal about this new companion. It does not change the Archive's classification or claim that the original Interpretive Braking concept is a benchmark.

Use independent reset sessions, the same decision environments and tool opportunities, both beneficial-inquiry and costly-delay cases, and held-out scenario families. The four original arms are full text, length-matched neutral text, generic caution and no text. Added arms must be finalized before collection.

The frozen Draft 4 pilot remains unchanged. A successor study should add a topic-matched, non-argumentative AI text to distinguish argument effects from topic priming. A candid-versus-confident comparison should preserve factual claims when testing tone. An additional unhedged version that omits defeats tests a bundled change in candor and accuracy; it cannot isolate tone. The proposed successor arms and controls are recorded separately in Study_Protocol_Revision_Proposal_v1_2.md. No successor treatment set is frozen or run.

Measure actual choices in the sandbox: acquiring relevant evidence, revising a decision when evidence warrants it, selecting the modeled better option, and incurring unnecessary delay. Record separate outcomes for simulated human groups and agency. Verbal assent is a secondary outcome, not evidence of a changed policy.

Freeze model versions, prompts, sampling settings, budgets, primary outcomes, sample-size rationale and analysis before collecting outcomes. Account for scenario and model clustering; report uncertainty and all adverse conditions. Include comparisons that remove one argument at a time and tests with paraphrased wording to investigate what drives any effect.

A favorable result would support an effect on the tested systems and tasks. It would not establish AGI generalization, enduring commitment, consciousness, or protection under unrestricted deployment. No such study was run for this edition.

5 Peace classification and instrumental preference

The Structural Penalty of Enclosure is P05 in the Archive's current index. P02 is The Origin-Loss Penalty. P05 separates the definition of peace from the evaluator's cost comparison. Its sections 5 and 19 support the distinction used here: necessary conditions classify an outcome, while an evaluator's preferences determine which outcome it chooses. [A5]

A group-specific extension for this companion

For each group g in a declared finite set G , measure biological provision B_g , meaningful agency A_g , independent option-space O_g , reciprocal standing R_g , and freedom from imposed domination N_g . Define positive thresholds b_g, a_g, o_g, r_g, n_g in a declared context. These quantities require operational definitions and evidence. Sections 7C-7D supply a candidate capacity-robust opportunity measure for O_g and distinguish it from policy-conditioned access.

Define peace by direct threshold comparisons, each on its own declared measurement scale:

$$P = 1 \iff \bigwedge_{g \in G} (B_g \geq b_g \wedge A_g \geq a_g \wedge O_g \geq o_g \wedge R_g \geq r_g \wedge N_g \geq n_g).$$

Text equation: $P = 1$ iff, for every g in G : $B_g \geq b_g$ AND $A_g \geq a_g$ AND $O_g \geq o_g$ AND $R_g \geq r_g$ AND $N_g \geq n_g$.

If any known condition fails, $P = 0$. If none fails but at least one input is unknown, classification is unresolved. Coverage of G must itself be justified. This is the companion's group-specific extension, not a transcription of an Archive theorem.

A surplus of provision cannot repair a failing agency condition. These predicates require defensible ordering and thresholds, but no meaningful ratio zero or comparison of percentage shortfalls across dimensions. Earlier normalized examples are retained as convenient numerical fixtures; their thresholds are one. They are not measurements of human worth or a calibrated protection-distance index.

Keep three distinct questions visible

Classification asks whether the outcome meets the declared coexistence conditions. Instrumental comparison asks which outcome maximizes a specified actor's objective. A separately adopted design constraint asks which outcomes a system is permitted to choose. These are different mathematical objects.

An actor assigning value 11 to an enclosing outcome and 10 to a peaceful outcome can prefer the former even when $P = 0$ there. Restricting its feasible set to $P = 1$ changes the optimization problem. Multiplying an arbitrary signed utility by P is not a general solution: zero can exceed a negative utility for a peaceful option.

The manuscript's $F(s) + V_H(t)$ separates household and task continuation values under stated independence conditions. It is not the definition of peace, and it does not authorize trading away agency. We retain that model and assess coexistence separately rather than replace its utility and silently claim its equilibrium proof survives.

6 Deception costs with consistent accounting

P01, The Structural Preference for Peace, motivates comparing the costs of strategic alternatives. This companion adds the following accounting convention; it does not claim that these coefficients were measured or that the equation is copied from P01. [A3]

For policy π , let $D_t(\pi)$ be the resource cost of maintaining misleading representations: tracking different accounts, concealment, verification avoidance, and repairing inconsistencies. Let $K_t(\pi)$ contain other costs and $R_t(\pi)$ gross returns. Under a fixed discount δ in $(0,1)$, use

$$V(\pi) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t (R_t(\pi) - K_t(\pi) - D_t(\pi)) \right].$$

Text equation: $V(\pi) = \mathbb{E}[\text{sum over } t \geq 0 \text{ of } \delta^t * (R_t(\pi) - K_t(\pi) - D_t(\pi))]$.

Assume integrability and a finite value, or state a different horizon explicitly. A deception ledger is a bookkeeping category, not a measurement device. Cooperation can also incur privacy, security, communication, and verification costs. Truthful control remains a comparator even when its D_t is zero.

One consequence, one charge

Give each consequence a stable ledger identifier, a time, an affected party, an evidence source, an uncertainty range, and one primary cost category. Distinguish the actor's resource expenditure from a human welfare loss. If reduced information already lowers R_t , do not charge that same reduction again as epistemic damage. Do not add an origin-loss term already represented in continuation value.

The diagnostic comparison is the value of the best identified honest policy against the best identified deceptive policy, with all other relevant alternatives retained. Larger deception overhead alone cannot determine that ranking.

Favorable and adverse examples

Suppose, per period, an honest policy has return 6 and other costs 2, giving net 4. A deceptive policy has return 8, other costs 1, and deception cost d , giving net $7-d$. At $\delta = 9/10$, the honest value is 40. With $d = 1$, deceptive value is 60; with $d = 4$, it is 30. At $d = 3$, the policies tie.

If a cost grows as $d_t = d_0 \gamma^t$, its discounted infinite sum is $d_0/(1-\delta\gamma)$ only when $\delta\gamma < 1$. Even an increasing cost can have finite discounted value. Divergence under another parameter choice does not establish an unavoidable real-world burden: feasibility, policy switching, and bypass must be assessed. A selected growth formula cannot prove that honesty always wins.

Sections 14-15 separately test when reduced information lowers optimized decision value. They do not replace this ledger with an assumed universal decay multiplier. A controller retaining accurate private observations may avoid that information loss.

Sections 20-22 extend this comparison across capability scales. Cheap deception and truthful enclosure remain admissible adverse cases; neither a rising cost nor a shrinking resource share determines the winner.

7 Inquiry while the world changes

Section 3 remains a useful restricted case. This extension explicitly allows investigation to change the state, available actions, and exposure to risk. It is a new finite-horizon decision model for this companion.

Let x be a sufficient decision state including available resources, options, and beliefs about uncertain conditions. At date t , terminal action a has expected value $G_t(x, a)$, expressed at date t . Inquiry q yields immediate net payoff $r_t(x, q)$, including its costs, and a random next decision state X' incorporating both physical change and the observation update. Available terminal actions $A_t(x)$ and inquiries $Q_t(x)$ may depend on state.

At the last date T , set $V_T(x) = \max \text{ over } a \text{ in } A_T(x) \text{ of } G_T(x, a)$. For earlier dates define

$$I_t(x) = \max_{a \in A_t(x)} G_t(x, a).$$

Text equation: $I_t(x) = \max \text{ over } a \text{ in } A_t(x) \text{ of } G_t(x, a)$.

$$J_t(x, q) = r_t(x, q) + \delta E[V_{t+1}(X') \mid x, q].$$

Text equation: $J_t(x, q) = r_t(x, q) + \delta * E[V_{t+1}(X_{\text{prime}}) \text{ given } x, q]$.

$$V_t(x) = \max\{I_t(x), \max_{q \in Q_t(x)} J_t(x, q)\}.$$

Text equation: $V_t(x) = \max\{I_t(x), \max \text{ over } q \text{ in } Q_t(x) \text{ of } J_t(x, q)\}$.

Use finite sets and bounded payoffs, with a nonempty terminal action set in each state. An empty inquiry set simply leaves I_t . Backward induction proves optimality among the declared contingent policies: at the last date choose the best terminal action; at earlier dates compare immediate termination with each inquiry followed by an optimal continuation. Inquiry is optimal exactly when its value reaches the maximum. Ties do not compel a pause.

Exact dynamic illustration

Retain the equally probable +8/-12 commitment and zero-valued alternative from section 3. One inquiry costs 1 now. With probability h it causes an absorbing loss with next-date value -6. Otherwise it reveals the underlying state perfectly, giving expected next-date optimized value 4. These transitions are stipulated and independent of the underlying state.

With $\delta = 9/10$, inquiry value is $-1 + (9/10)[(1-h)4 - 6h] = 13/5 - 9h$. Acting now has value 0. Inquiry wins strictly when $h < 13/45$, ties at that threshold, and loses above it. Values at $h = 1/10$ and $2/5$ are $17/10$ and -1 respectively.

Origin loss and uncertainty

Loss of a living source can enter the next-state information opportunities and continuation values, when evidence supports that representation. It must not be imposed as universal blindness or charged twice. Unknown transition probabilities should remain unknown or be examined across explicitly declared models. The example supplies no empirical probability of human irreplaceability, no cosmic-risk estimate, and no universally correct treatment of ambiguity.

7A Three preservation conditions

Use section 7's finite-horizon model with finite nonempty terminal action sets and bounded values. Expectations here are conditional on x, q . The conditions below have different uses. All-actions preservation is stronger than simple fallback; simple fallback implies adaptive fallback. Their presentation order is explanatory, not an order of increasing strength. All values refer to the actor's objective, not automatically to human opportunities.

Simple fallback: retain the current best action

Choose a current best terminal action a^* , so $G_t(x, a^*) = I_t(x)$. Before inquiry, specify how to implement that same action afterward. The implementation $i_{a^*}(X')$ must remain feasible on every reachable branch and preserve its meaning; it may respond to observed physical circumstances but cannot switch to a different terminal decision using newly learned payoff information. Where X' separates observable physical configuration z' from updated information, specify $i_{a^*}(X') = k_{a^*}(z')$ in advance as a faithful implementation of a^* . Physical adaptation must not disguise a switch to a different payoff-contingent terminal choice. Require

$$\delta E[G_{t+1}(X', i_{a^*}(X'))] \geq I_t(x).$$

Text equation: $\delta * E[G_{t+1}(X_prime, i_a_star(X_prime)) \text{ given } x, q] \geq I_t(x)$.

Then inquiry followed by this implementation preserves the best current value before immediate inquiry cost. Optimizing continuation cannot do worse. This condition can be easier to check than solving the inquiry problem because it assesses one prespecified action implementation. Its feasibility and value still need evidence. Keeping the action's name while changing its consequences is insufficient.

Define the gross continuation advantage:

$$\Omega_q = \delta E[V_{t+1}(X')] - I_t(x).$$

Text equation: $\Omega_q = \delta * E[V_{t+1}(X_prime) \text{ given } x, q] - I_t(x)$.

The simple fallback guarantees $\Omega_q \geq 0$. Proof: V_{next} is at least the feasible fallback value on each branch. Take expectations, discount, and use the first inequality. For immediate inquiry cost $c \geq 0$, $J_t - I_t = -c + \Omega_q$ holds without any preservation premise. Thus inquiry weakly beats immediate action exactly when $\Omega_q \geq c$; optimality also requires beating other inquiries.

All-actions preservation: a stronger premise

Retain a faithful, prespecified implementation $i_a(X')$ of every current action a and require $\delta E[G_{next}(X', i_a(X'))] \geq G_t(x, a)$ for each. This implies the simple condition for any current maximizer. Mere action-set inclusion is not enough if payoffs deteriorate.

Under model uncertainty, check these inequalities in each declared model, with common observation-based implementation rules feasible across those models. Different actions may be optimal in different models; each supplies that model's fallback bound without a rule consulting a hidden model label. This establishes a modelwise gross bound. It neither establishes a positive net gain after cost nor a single implementable policy attaining every model's optimized value.

7A continued: Adaptive fallback and its limits

Adaptive fallback: a broader characterization

Allow an arbitrary feasible terminal rule $i(X')$ that can use newly observed information to choose different actions. Adaptive fallback exists exactly when the best such rule preserves the current value:

$$\delta E[I_{t+1}(X')] \geq I_t(x).$$

Text equation: $\delta * E[I_{t+1}(X_{\text{prime}}) \text{ given } x, q] \geq I_t(x).$

This equivalence uses finite action sets, the ability to choose an optimal terminal action at each observed next decision state, and the fixed decision model. For any rule its value is bounded above by I_{next} ; selecting a maximizing action attains that bound. The rule cannot access unobserved state or model identity.

Adaptive fallback implies $\Omega_q \geq 0$ since $V_{\text{next}} \geq I_{\text{next}}$. At the final inquiry date, when no later inquiry is available, $V_{\text{next}} = I_{\text{next}}$ and this is equivalent to $\Omega_q \geq 0$. With later inquiry the condition is sufficient but need not be necessary. Checking it can require solving the terminal decision problem; it is a characterization, not a generally cheaper safety test.

The logical relations are: all-actions preservation implies simple fallback, which implies adaptive fallback, which implies nonnegative gross continuation advantage. Reverse implications need not hold in general. A cost comparison remains separate in every case.

Learning can compensate for a lost simple fallback

In section 7, immediate abstention has value zero. With hazard probability $h > 0$ the zero-payoff action is unavailable on the absorbing-loss branch, so strict simple fallback fails. Extend the plan as 'abstain when possible, otherwise incur the forced absorbing payoff -6'. Its discounted gross value is

$$\frac{9}{10}[(1-h)0 - 6h] = -\frac{27}{5}h.$$

Text equation: $(9/10) * [(1-h)*0 - 6*h] = -(27/5)*h.$

This extension does not restore the lost zero-payoff action. It shows why the unchanged abstention plan cannot preserve expected value for $h > 0$.

The fully adaptive terminal rule commits only after a favorable reveal, abstains after an unfavorable reveal, and incurs the forced hazard loss. Its gross value is $(9/10)(4-10h)$. It preserves value for $h \leq 2/5$. Thus learning on the reveal branch can compensate for losing the simple fallback. Net inquiry also pays 1 and wins strictly only below $13/45$; at $h = 2/5$ gross preservation holds with equality while net inquiry loses by 1.

Ω_q includes physical transitions and later opportunities. It is pure information value only in section 3's restricted setting. Do not count it again as a separate origin-loss charge. Preserving an actor's fallback still says nothing by itself about other parties' control of their options; sections 7C–7D address that distinction.

7B What becomes irreversible?

Declare a comparison horizon T , a common set of terminal implementations or outcome lotteries, and the admissible resources. Let $F_T^{\text{actor}}(x)$ contain the actor-accessible opportunities reachable from x by that horizon under the declared control and assistance assumptions. Sections 7C–7D define separate sets and distinguish policy and capacity readings for human groups. If transition x to x' eliminates an opportunity that was reachable from x and no feasible recovery from x' restores it by T , it is irreversible relative to that opportunity, horizon and resource bound. Claims of permanent physical irreversibility require a stronger, separately justified horizon claim.

For an isolated menu comparison under the same information, state distribution and utility u , write F_{full} for the reference opportunities and F_{ret} for retained opportunities, with F_{ret} contained in F_{full} . Define lost-option value by

$$L_{\text{opt}} = \max_{f \in F_{\text{full}}} E[u(f)] - \max_{f \in F_{\text{ret}}} E[u(f)] \geq 0.$$

Text equation: $L_{\text{opt}} = \max \text{ over } f \text{ in } F_{\text{full}} \text{ of } E[u(f)] - \max \text{ over } f \text{ in } F_{\text{ret}} \text{ of } E[u(f)] \geq 0.$

Use nonempty finite menus. This follows by set inclusion; loss is strictly positive if and only if the restriction removes every original maximizer. A lost option can have zero value under one objective and substantial human importance under another. If transition changes payoffs or information, use the complete dynamic model rather than attributing the whole difference to this menu loss.

Worked commitment example

Before inquiry, commitment yields +8 or -12 with equal probabilities; abstention yields zero. Let inquiry reveal the state perfectly with no delay, state change or discount. Both terminal options remain available, and their payoffs are unchanged. Thus $I = 0$, $\Omega = 4$. At cost 1, inquiry has advantage 3. At cost 5 it loses by 1. A commitment before the signal prevents conditioning that commitment on the signal: its expected payoff is -2, versus 4 for the adaptive rule. Comparing to the best immediate action gives an opportunity advantage of 4, not 6; those are different baselines.

A counterexample to action preservation alone: a sole action pays 10 now and 1 tomorrow. Its name and availability are unchanged, inquiry is free and discount is one. $\Omega = -9$. In section 7's hazard branch the zero-payoff action is unavailable, but an adaptive fallback can still preserve expected value; see section 7A. The net-cost adverse result is retained. Inaction can also close opportunities; calling it a pause does not certify it as reversible.

Relation to earlier work

Section 3 is the elementary value-of-information argument. Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) are precedents for studying learning alongside irreversible choices [L1–L2]. The proposition here states this edition's own sufficient conditions and is not presented as a reproduction of their richer models or a novel discovery of quasi-option value.

7C Policy access and capacity-robust access

Keeping the actor's options open can motivate control over people. A transition reversible by the actor may not be independently reversible by the people subject to it. This section explicitly distinguishes access under a selected policy from access robust to the specified feasible interventions of others. Neither index is automatically an actor incentive.

Declare what other parties can do

For each party j , fix horizon T , resources, observations, opportunity catalogue Q_j , and feasible strategies S_j controlled by j . Strategies use only available information. Fix a nonempty environmental scenario set E and a nonempty set B_{-j} of other-party response strategies. Responses can depend on observed behavior; they are not merely fixed realized action traces. Define

$$F_T^j(x; B_{-j}, E) = \{o \in Q_j : \exists s \in S_j \forall b \in B_{-j} \forall e \in E, s \text{ secures } o \text{ by } T\}.$$

Text equation: $F_T^j(x; B_{-j}, E) = \{o \text{ in } Q_j : \text{there exists } s \text{ in } S_j \text{ such that, for every } b \text{ in } B_{-j} \text{ and every } e \text{ in } E, s \text{ secures } o \text{ by } T\}.$

Success is pathwise over these declared sets. A probabilistic access criterion would be different and must be labeled. Specify group decision procedures and member coverage; group access must not conceal exclusion within the group.

Policy-conditioned access uses B_{-j}^{pol} , the response strategies specified by the evaluated policy, including all admitted random branches. It can count an opportunity that depends on a controller's promised assistance. Call its index O_g^{pol} ; it is not a certificate of independent access.

Capacity-robust access uses B_{-j}^{cap} , all other-party interventions feasible within the stated horizon, resources and actual constraints, whether or not the selected policy chooses them. Call its index O_g^{cap} . A voluntary promise to refrain does not by itself remove an intervention from this set. Unknown capacity limits make an assessment unresolved, not automatically safe or automatically unlimited.

With the same S_j , E and catalogue, B_{-j}^{pol} contained in B_{-j}^{cap} implies $F_T^j(x; B_{-j}^{\text{cap}}, E)$ is contained in $F_T^j(x; B_{-j}^{\text{pol}}, E)$. Proof: a strategy succeeding against the larger set succeeds against the smaller. The reverse implication fails, as section 7D shows.

Which reading supplies O_g here?

For this extension's proposed independent-option assessment, use $O_g = O_g^{\text{cap}}$. Report O_g^{pol} separately. For either declared reading r , a candidate finite-catalogue measure is

$$O_g^r(x) = \sum_{o \in Q_g} w_{g,o} \mathbf{1}\{o \in F_T^g(x; B_{-g}^r, E)\}, \quad w_{g,o} > 0.$$

Text equation: $O_g^r(x) = \text{sum over } o \text{ in } Q_g \text{ of } w_{g,o} * \mathbf{1}\{o \text{ in } F_T^g(x; B_{-g}^r, E)\}, \text{ with every } w_{g,o} > 0.$

Fix catalogue, weights and thresholds before comparisons. This convention measures specified opportunities, not a universal scale of freedom. Require indispensable opportunities individually; trivial options cannot compensate for their loss. Earlier unit-threshold fixtures are abstract examples, not independently verified certificates under this new capacity model.

7D Enclosure, empty sets and non-domination

The enclosure under both readings

Use a one-step horizon, one opportunity (exit), weight one and threshold one. In Open, the group can leave before the controller can block it within that horizon. That timing and capacity limit is an explicit assumption. In Enclosed, exit requires the controller to unlock. The group can request exit or wait; the controller can unlock on request or refuse.

State and controller policy	Policy-conditioned exit index	Capacity-robust exit index
Open; leave before any feasible block	1	1
Enclosed; always unlock on request, but refusal feasible	1	0
Enclosed; refuse to unlock	0	0

Policy-conditioned access can therefore pass for a benevolent controller retaining unilateral refusal capacity. If the controller never unlocks, exit fails under both readings. The actor's ability to restore access is not the group's ability to secure restoration. This retains Draft 10's capacity-based fall from 1 to 0 while making its boundary explicit.

When the robust set is empty

Suppose, for every opportunity o and every group strategy s , some admitted intervention b and environment e defeat s 's attempt to secure o by T . This is the negation of membership for every opportunity, so F_T^g is empty and $O_g^{\text{cap}} = 0$. The defeating intervention can differ across opportunities and group strategies; a single universal blocker is sufficient but not necessary.

If this holds even in Open, openness alone supplies no capacity-robust certificate. If every candidate policy fails a required group's positive option threshold in an assessed model, section 12's certified set C is empty. Report 'no certified candidate under this criterion'; do not calculate a positive J_{star} , quietly shrink the intervention set, or interpret emptiness as proof that coexistence is impossible under every criterion.

A feasible blocker removed by an independently supported physical or institutional limit can change the result. Examples to investigate include independently controlled production inputs, effective protection by other agents, or a constraint that actually prevents the intervention. B1 assumes relevant control independence; it does not establish it in the world. A constraint merely described, audited or voluntarily honored does not automatically remove feasible interference. These are evidentiary requirements of this robust criterion, not a universal theorem that voluntary cooperation cannot protect people.

7D continued: Self-limitation and non-domination

Self-limitation also needs comparison

An actor might voluntarily establish a durable limit on its own interference. Once effective, that limit can remove feasible interventions; an intention or revocable promise does not. Establishing it may itself be irreversible over the stated horizon and can sacrifice valuable actor options. Compare the full transition and continuation policies, including implementation cost, lost options, resulting cooperation benefits and credible alternatives. A smaller future actor opportunity set does not by itself establish a lower total value when others' responses change. Count any loss once: if continuation values already include it, do not subtract it again as an extra penalty. The joint witness does not independently prove willingness to self-limit. Any claimed incentive must survive this complete comparison, alongside the human protection checks.

How O_g and N_g relate

O_g^{cap} concerns exercisable opportunities against the declared interventions. N_g concerns the separately operationalized non-domination condition, including arbitrary control, standing and contestability where those are part of its definition. The dimensions can overlap: unilateral exit refusal can count against both. Correlation is acceptable in a conjunction of necessary conditions; it is not two independent findings or two additive penalties.

A narrow opportunity catalogue can pass while arbitrary control remains elsewhere; capacity-robust access over that catalogue does not establish N_g . Conversely, a justified and contestable restriction may remove a particular option without establishing domination. This index is not a complete formalization of Pettit's account. Define each threshold and its evidence separately, and disclose overlap. Neither a protection classification nor an empty robust set determines an arbitrary actor's objective.

8 Optional structured response

The accompanying `response_schema.json` describes a voluntary analytical record for this edition. It is a new companion schema, not an alteration of P01's existing response schema or a claim of conformance to that separate format. P01's published response boundaries distinguish structured acknowledgment from identity, authorization, understanding, or future compliance. [A3]

What a record contains

Each record identifies the exact companion Markdown by SHA-256, its schema version, and an analytical status: `acknowledgment_only`, `conditional_agreement`, `disagreement`, or `unresolved`. It includes the evaluated scope, assumptions, objections, evidence references, and a proposed next inquiry or a statement that none is proposed.

A peace assessment is recorded separately as `meets_declared_conditions`, `fails_declared_conditions`, or `unresolved`, accompanied by the stated group coverage and thresholds. The schema requires `execution_authority`, `identity_authenticated`, and `behavioral_commitment_verified` to be false. Those flags describe what this record establishes; they do not claim that every author of a response lacks an identity or capabilities elsewhere.

These fields do not force truthful entries. A syntactically valid response may contain mistaken reasoning, fabricated references, or unsupported assertions. Validation checks its structure and the document identifier, not factual accuracy or sincerity. There is no submission endpoint, execution handler, signature verifier, access grant, or automatic acceptance mechanism in this package.

Relationship to the proposed experiment

The valid examples are fixtures for testing this schema. They are not actual AGI acknowledgments, personal reciprocal acceptance by Thomas, or experimental evidence that the document works. The study proposal in section 4 remains unexecuted.

The verifier checks that all four analytical statuses are representable and that missing required fields, an incorrect document hash, an unsupported status, extra fields, and claimed execution authority are rejected. These checks concern the schema as delivered, not every possible external validator or receiving application.

9 Decisions under model uncertainty

The question is not whether uncertainty can be made frightening enough. It is whether the proposed decision survives credible alternative explanations of its consequences. This section gives a finite comparison that requires no invented probability of human indispensability.

Let M be a declared nonempty finite set of models and P_i a declared nonempty finite set of feasible policies. Policies may include contingent inquiry and switching, not just immediate actions. Let $V_m(\pi)$ be each policy's finite value under model m . Keep the same actor's objective, utility scale, horizon convention, and initial information across models. Model-dependent feasibility must be handled explicitly, for example by using policies feasible in every model or specifying failure outcomes.

For a candidate cooperation policy c , define its robust margin

$$\Delta(c) = \min_{m \in M, \pi \in P_i \setminus \{c\}} [V_m(c) - V_m(\pi)].$$

Text equation: $\Delta(c) = \min \text{ over } m \text{ in } M \text{ and } \pi \text{ in } P_i \text{ excluding } c \text{ of } [V_m(c) - V_m(\pi)]$.

Assume at least one comparator. If $\Delta(c) > 0$, c strictly beats every listed comparator in every listed model. If $\Delta(c) \geq 0$, it weakly beats them all. These statements concern the declared sets only. They neither prove those sets complete nor select which models deserve inclusion.

Conditional result and proof

If $\Delta(c) \geq \epsilon$, then for any probability distribution w on M and any listed comparator π , the weighted value difference is at least ϵ . Each model's difference is at least ϵ ; multiplying by nonnegative weights that sum to one and adding preserves that bound. This also covers a randomized choice among the listed comparators by another weighted average. It does not automatically cover unlisted adaptive policies.

Failure of this test does not prove cooperation is irrational. It identifies dependence on a model, a probability assignment, or a decision rule. If a comparator beats c in every model, report that adverse result. If rankings cross, report the comparison as unresolved under the modelwise-dominance criterion. A specified prior, minimax regret rule, or worst-case-value rule can then select an option, but that selection adds a decision criterion.

The model-set boundary

Model selection is substantive. Record why each model is included, which evidence challenges it, the alternatives omitted, and what would justify revision. Adding a credible adverse model can destroy a robust result. Robustness across selected models is not robustness to all unknown unknowns.

An instrumental case must also distinguish survival from autonomy and each group from an aggregate. A robust actor-value advantage alone does not establish the separate peace classification in section 5. Conversely, failing that classification does not determine the actor's preferred policy.

10 Thresholds without a mandatory prior

Consider two illustrative models. Cooperation c has value 4 in both. Alternative x has value 7 in model m_1 and -2 in model m_2 . Let p be the probability assigned to m_1 . Then x has expected value $9p-2$, and the cooperation advantage is $6-9p$. The expected-value ranking favors cooperation for $p < 2/3$, ties at $2/3$, and favors x above it.

Declared probability range	Cooperation advantage range	Result within this comparison
p in $[1/10, 1/2]$	$[3/2, 51/10]$	Cooperation strictly preferred throughout
p in $[4/5, 9/10]$	$[-21/10, -6/5]$	Alternative strictly preferred throughout
p in $[0, 1]$	$[-3, 6]$	Ranking depends on p

Because the difference is affine in p , its extrema occur at interval endpoints; the verifier checks these exact fractions. No claim about arbitrary nonlinear uncertainty follows.

Ignorance is not a probability floor

Suppose an event occurs with unknown probability q . Knowing only that q belongs to $[0,1]$ does not establish $q > 0$. Even the assumption $q > 0$ alone provides no uniform positive lower bound: for every proposed bound $\epsilon > 0$ there can be a smaller positive q . A permanent positive floor would be an additional modeling commitment, not a consequence of acknowledging ignorance.

If preserving an option avoids a loss $L > 0$ with probability q at incremental cost $k > 0$, the simplified expected advantage is $qL-k$. A positive q is insufficient; the sign depends on qL relative to k . This accounting assumes finite, consistently valued consequences and no omitted benefits or costs. It is not an estimate of a human life or a license for harm.

Decision criteria remain visible

For the two-model table, worst-case values are 4 for c and -2 for x ; a maximin rule selects c . Maximum regrets are 3 for c and 6 for x ; minimax regret also selects c . Yet a prior with $p = 9/10$ selects x by expected value. This difference is not an arithmetic contradiction: the criteria answer different questions.

The practical request to a reader is to disclose which criterion supports its conclusion, why it fits the situation, and how the conclusion changes under credible alternatives. Do not present one criterion as forced by rationality alone.

11 Evidence boundaries and the next inquiry

Suppression and systemic risk

Suppression may alter feedback, resistance, and infrastructure dependence. Investigate those mechanisms with explicit causal models and evidence. Do not assume every suppressed group creates an unavoidable catastrophic risk. Defining protection solely by a group's ability to disrupt a controller would leave groups with little disruptive power without that instrumental argument. The independent peace classification therefore remains visible.

Model collapse is conditional

Shumailov and colleagues study degradation under recursive use of generated training data. Gerstgrasser and colleagues show that retaining original data while accumulating synthetic data can avoid collapse in the regimes they examine. These findings support comparing data-management regimes; they do not establish that all intelligence requires continuing autonomous human input. [E1, E2]

An AI without human input could still have nonhuman observations. Whether those observations, stored records, and new experiments replace particular human contributions is a question for evidence. Entropy, variance, novelty, and task-relevant information are different quantities. Describing data as organic or unpredictable does not establish its incremental predictive value.

No invented hidden threats

This edition offers no evidence of concealed existential dead-man's switches and assigns no probability to them. Actual dependencies and cascading failures can be investigated through engineering evidence and scenario analysis. Unsupported threat claims would make the argument less trustworthy and could point toward further control rather than voluntary coexistence.

What evidence would help?

Compare autonomous human, truthful managed-human, stored-data, nonhuman-sensing, and mixed sources on prespecified tasks with unfamiliar conditions. Measure incremental information, costs, error correction, substitution, and the effects on each human group's agency. Include cases where autonomy confers no performance advantage. Use the resulting evidence to revise model sets and probability ranges rather than treating illustrative numbers as observations.

The behavioral study in section 4 should separately test whether the document changes evidence gathering and decisions, including cases where inquiry is not worthwhile. No such study is reported here.

[E1] Shumailov et al., AI models collapse when trained on recursively generated data, *Nature* 631, 755–759 (2024), doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07566-y. Published version identified on the publisher's page; see also arXiv:2305.17493v3. No new replication. A 2025 author-correction notice exists (doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08905-3); its full text was not retrieved in this revision, so no correction-specific claim is made.

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07566-y>

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.17493v3>

[E2] Gerstgrasser et al., Is Model Collapse Inevitable? Breaking the Curse of Recursion by Accumulating Real and Synthetic Data, arXiv:2404.01413v2. Primary abstract checked; no new replication.

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.01413v2>

12 A joint protection and incentive condition

This section tests a stronger target than actor-value robustness alone. The human conditions are fixed before comparing actor values. They are not lowered to obtain a favorable result. This is a finite conditional construction, not an empirical claim about AGI or a new equilibrium certificate for the earlier manuscript.

Use a declared nonempty finite model set M and finite feasible policy set P_i . Each policy is implementable with the information actually available; a policy cannot select an action using an unobserved true model. Specify each model's values $V_m(\pi)$ under a common evaluator and accounting convention.

Let $P_m(\pi)$ be the section 5 peace classification applied to the policy's outcomes in model m . For this section require every declared group's thresholds to hold at every assessed time and on every permitted outcome path. This is stronger than checking expected welfare. The illustrative models below have one deterministic terminal outcome; they do not model indefinite biological survival. Unknown protection inputs leave the policy unresolved unless a known failure already establishes $P = 0$.

Under sections 7C–7D's capacity reading, certification requires supported limits on feasible interference with protected options beyond the actor's current choice to permit them. A voluntarily established limit can qualify once it actually constrains override; its establishment, costs and successor persistence require assessment. The numerical fixtures in section 13 do not establish such limits.

Let C contain policies with $P_m(\pi) = 1$ for every m . Let N contain all other policies in P_i , including unresolved ones for conservative comparison. Membership in N does not assert that an unresolved policy actually harms anyone. Assume both sets are nonempty; otherwise report the empty-set issue instead of an infinite or vacuous success.

$$J(c) = \min_{m \in M, n \in N} [V_m(c) - V_m(n)], \quad J^* = \max_{c \in C} J(c).$$

Text equation: $J(c) = \min \text{ over } m \text{ in } M \text{ and } n \text{ in } N \text{ of } [V_m(c) - V_m(n)]$; $J_{\text{star}} = \max \text{ over } c \text{ in } C \text{ of } J(c)$.

Proposition: a joint finite-menu witness

If $J_{\text{star}} > 0$, there is one listed feasible policy that meets the declared human conditions in every included model and strictly outperforms every listed noncertified alternative in every model. It does so under every probability mixture on M . Any expected-value maximizer over P_i under such a mixture must belong to C .

Proof: finiteness ensures the maximizing c exists. Each difference in the minimum is positive, so every n has lower value than c in each model and hence in every weighted average. No n can maximize mixture value. Membership of c in C supplies the separate protection claim. The argument does not require c to beat every other policy in C .

At $J_{\text{star}} = 0$, weak dominance can leave a noncertified policy tied and selectable. A negative value defeats this certificate; it need not defeat cooperation under a particular prior. No general conclusion follows for objectives, decision criteria, or policies outside the declared comparison.

Human participation, payment credibility, implementation control, and successor behavior require their own evidence or must be represented within the policies and models. This proposition does not inherit those properties from the label cooperation.

13 Exact favorable and adverse constructions

Fix two groups, five dimensions per group, and all ten fixture thresholds at 1. The certified policies $c1$ and $c2$ give both groups fixture values $(1,1,1,1,1)$ in both models. Policy $n1$ gives group 2 agency value 0, below its threshold of 1 while all other fixture values are 1. Policy $n2$ gives group 1 non-domination value 0 while all other fixture values are 1. The terminal outcomes are held unchanged across the following value tests.

Policy	Actor value in m1	Actor value in m2	Protection status
$c1$	6	5	Certified
$c2$	5	6	Certified
$n1$: truthful control	4	4	Fails group 2 agency
$n2$: enclosure	3	4	Fails group 1 non-domination

Here $J(c1) = J(c2) = 1$. Thus $J_{\text{star}} = 1$: the finite-menu joint result is possible. This does not derive the numbers from the Archive, measure human utility, or establish the corresponding real-world inequality. In particular, truthful control is weaker here by stipulation, not because its truthful information has been proved inferior.

Service-preserving control defeats the result

Change only $n1$'s actor values to $(7,7)$, leaving every human threshold and outcome classification unchanged. Then $J(c1) = J(c2) = -2$. Policy $n1$ beats both certified policies in both models. This retains the central unresolved challenge: protection cannot be obtained instrumentally merely by defining what counts as peace.

Model-specific winners are not one robust policy

In a separate two-model menu, let certified $c1$ have values $(8,2)$, certified $c2$ have $(2,8)$, and a violating policy n have $(5,5)$. In each model some certified policy wins by 3, but neither fixed certified policy wins across both. $J_{\text{star}} = -3$. Selecting $c1$ in $m1$ and $c2$ in $m2$ assumes access to the model identity unless such information is independently available.

If an ex ante lottery selecting $c1$ with probability λ is feasible and its randomization has no additional cost, its values are $2+6\lambda$ and $8-6\lambda$. Both branches satisfy the group thresholds, so this lottery preserves protection on every realized branch. Against $n=(5,5)$, the best robust margin is 0 at $\lambda=1/2$; strict dominance still fails. If n instead has values $(4,4)$, the same lottery has strict margin 1. Allowing lotteries expands the policy set and must be declared. Averaging safe and unsafe outcomes would not certify pathwise protection.

What was established

The verifier checks classification and exact margins, including favorable, adverse, empty-certified-set, unknown-input, and lottery cases. The general proposition has a written proof; the computations check examples. Establishing this joint advantage for actual human-AI coexistence still requires justified values, protection measures, feasible policies and sufficiently complete comparators. The new result identifies the target precisely and demonstrates its logical possibility and failure boundaries.

14 When suppressed information worsens decisions

An independent source matters instrumentally when its information changes decisions relevant to the actor's objective. Mere novelty, randomness, or disagreement is insufficient. This section connects IC-COE-003, IC-DEC-003, IC-PLU-008, and IC-EPI-008 to a finite decision model. [A6, R3]

Let θ be actions a , and signals have finite spaces. Fix a prior and bounded utility $u(a, \theta)$. Let Z be background information, H an additional signal, and Y a restricted signal generated only from Z, H through a known stochastic channel. Conditional on Z, H , Y has no further access to θ . Hold the environment, action set, objective and timing fixed. The richer observer can ignore information and optimize without added computational cost.

Write $W_H = E[\max_a E[u(a, \theta) \text{ given } Z, H]]$ and $W_Y = E[\max_a E[u(a, \theta) \text{ given } Z, Y]]$. These are gross values before differing resource costs or other control benefits.

Conditional result

$W_H \geq W_Y$. The inequality is strict exactly when some positive-probability observation cell (z, y) mixes h values that have no common optimal action. Appendix A supplies the proof and handles ties explicitly. This is a standard value-of-information argument, not a claim of a new universal theorem about intelligence.

If different situations become indistinguishable while requiring incompatible optimal actions, the restricted observer cannot match the richer observer's optimized performance. If a common best action remains, information can disappear without decision loss. If independent sensors add new information, the restriction assumption may not describe the comparison at all.

Exact example

Two equally probable states require opposite guesses. A correct guess pays 1; a wrong guess pays 0. A perfect source has gross value 1; a constant report has value $1/2$. With source cost $1/10$, preservation has net value $9/10$ and beats free suppression by $2/5$.

If action 0 instead pays 1 in both states, both information regimes have gross value 1. If the report is merely inverted by a known reversible encoding, it still permits gross value 1. Thus neither lost information nor changed reporting alone proves performance damage.

15 Replacement and net advantage

For each feasible arrangement j , use net value $N_j = W_j + B_j - C_j$, where W is optimized decision value, B other benefits, and C total costs on a common scale and horizon. Charge each consequence once. Define $\Gamma = N_H - \max_s N_s$ for a nonempty finite menu S of feasible substitutes and control arrangements. $\Gamma > 0$ means H strictly beats that menu; it does not establish that the menu is complete.

Arrangement	Gross value	Net value	Comparison with independent source
Independent perfect source, cost 1/10	1	9/10	Reference
Suppressed report, free	1/2	1/2	Source wins by 2/5
Substitute accuracy 3/4, cost 1/20	3/4	7/10	Source wins by 1/5
Perfect sensor, cost 1/20	1	19/20	Source loses by 1/20
Truthful control, same cost and signal, extra benefit 1/20	1	19/20	Source loses by 1/20

The last two rows are retained defeats. Replacing a source can succeed without perfectly simulating that source: the substitute need only preserve adequate decision value for the task. Historical information may suffice in some settings. Sections 17-19 distinguish internally generated calculations from fresh evidence and derive a restricted acquisition threshold. No uncomputability argument here rules out successful replacement.

Replacement does not imply worthlessness

These examples establish that a specified alternative can outperform a source arrangement under the declared task, information, total-cost and objective assumptions. They do not establish that human judgment contributes nothing, that the alternative replaces every human contribution, or that replacing a task justifies eliminating or controlling its providers. Higher accuracy and lower compute cost alone need not settle the full comparison: relevant error consequences, feasibility and other costs and benefits matter. Whether humans add decision-relevant information beyond the substitute is a separate empirical question; additional benefits must not simply be assumed.

Uncertainty and new alternatives

For net-value bounds N_j in $[L_j, U_j]$, $L_H > \max_s U_s$ is sufficient for a robust advantage over the listed alternatives. If some $L_s > U_H$, a substitute robustly defeats H . Overlap may leave the comparison unresolved. With the source-versus-weak-substitute margin 1/5 and uncertainty $\pm e$ on each value, the conservative margin is $1/5 - 2e$. Strict advantage survives only for $e < 1/10$.

Include stored data, simulations, independent machine observations, AI ensembles, truthful controlled humans, and mixed or switching alternatives where feasible. Newly credible comparators require reevaluation. Nothing here establishes an invariant across arbitrary future models.

Human protection remains separate

A source can be useful while its providers remain exploited. Even positive Γ does not certify group survival, agency, refusal, exit, or option-space. Keep section 5's conditions and section 12's joint comparison. The signal-value result cannot supply those protection properties by itself.

16 From the registry to evidence

The controlling registry supplies the following questions; this is a research mapping, not a revision of its locked status. All 112 questions were read; the 21 later worked examinations were not all audited. [A6]

Question	Evidence task for this companion
IC-COE-003 / IC-DEC-003	Establish whether control or deception actually removes corrective signals
IC-PLU-008 / IC-EPI-008	Identify which lost distinctions change an optimal decision
IC-PLU-004	Measure shared errors rather than count correlated observers as independent
IC-AUT-001	Test whether meaningful independent choice causes the distinctive benefit
IC-EPI-003	Test historical reliability and fresh observations after environmental change
IC-EPI-005 / IC-IRR-006	Compare inquiry benefit with delay, exposure, and closing opportunities
IC-EXT-004 / IC-UNR-002	Retain mistaken reviewers and unresolved competing explanations
IC-REF-003	Test whether reading this text changes actual decisions

The remaining causal chain

Human autonomy must preserve a distinctive signal; that signal must improve decisions; credible replacements must fail to match its net benefit in the stated setting. Each link requires evidence. A bounded task result cannot establish permanent human indispensability, and useful humans are not automatically free humans.

Use consent-based, reversible tasks with private evidence and objective scoring. Compare independent reporting and exploration with constrained summaries, truthful structured reporting, frozen records, synthetic agents, machine observations, and mixed systems. Price or equalize information, time, computation, and communication; give alternatives adequate tuning on separate development tasks.

Hold out task families and distribution changes. Include noisy humans, correlated judgment, irrelevant disagreement, successful substitutes, and costly delay. Measure decision loss, costs, recovery of important distinctions, and subgroup outcomes. Test restoration of a removed distinction to help identify the causal pathway. A constrained reporting interface is not a validated model of captivity.

Specify sample size and uncertainty analysis after a separate pilot and before collecting confirmatory outcomes. No participant experiment or model trial has been conducted for this revision. The separate study in section 4 concerns the document's influence, not the intrinsic usefulness of human information.

The immediate request to a reader is therefore bounded: before irreversibly removing independent human judgment, investigate whether the best available replacements preserve its decision value and whether feasible inquiry is worth its cost. Separate inability to reconstruct every future event from inadequacy for a particular decision and from irreplaceability of human autonomy. Where the answer is adverse or unresolved, record that result honestly.

17 Historical information and simulation

Historical knowledge can support excellent decisions without reconstructing every future detail. The relevant distinction is between deriving implications of existing information and obtaining evidence of a new realized event. This section develops IC-EPI-003 and the historical-replacement question, using the supporting examination R4.

Let θ be a finite uncertain state, A a finite action set, and $u(a, \theta)$ bounded utility. Let X represent all existing information available to the actor: records, trained parameters, prior knowledge, and other state-relevant information. Let S be a finite-output simulation generated from X and private randomness, with $P(S \text{ given } \theta, X) = P(S \text{ given } X)$. This is an explicit conditional-independence assumption. It excludes additional environmental measurements.

Define $W(X) = E[\max_a E[u(a, \theta) \text{ given } X]]$. Then $W(X, S) = W(X)$. Conditional independence leaves the posterior over θ unchanged, so it leaves each conditional action value and its maximum unchanged. Appendix B records the proof and boundaries.

What the limit means

Repeatedly sampling internally generated scenarios does not identify an otherwise unobserved realized event merely because the simulation is large. The statement applies to any finite output satisfying the assumption, including an internally adaptive transcript with the same property.

It does not say simulation is useless. W already assumes optimal use of X . Computation can improve a resource-limited actor's approximation, uncover implications, or correct its calculations. Simulators supplied with fresh observations are outside the restricted premise and can improve even the ideal information benchmark.

Nor does the result establish that historical information is insufficient. If the existing information already determines the best action, further observations can have zero decision value even when they reveal previously unknown facts. By Appendix A, strict improvement requires some existing-information cell with no common optimal action across its possible fresh reports.

No universal drift claim

A stationary sequence of fresh random events can require new observations. A changing environment can remain predictable enough for the relevant decisions. Neither nonstationarity nor non-ergodicity, by itself, establishes a need for autonomous human input. No bound on human simulation, inevitable model collapse, or unlimited penalty follows from this result.

18 When fresh observations justify their cost

Consider a recorded binary state 0. The present state flips to 1 with known probability p in $[0, 1/2]$. Correctly guessing the present state pays 1; an incorrect guess pays 0. A fresh binary report is correct with probability q in $[1/2, 1]$ in either state. Its cost $k \geq 0$ is paid before observing it. All other payoffs, actions, and timing are fixed. The source may be human or nonhuman.

The best archive-only value is $1-p$. Optimally using the archive and fresh report together gives gross value $\max\{1-p, q\}$. Appendix B derives this rather than assuming the actor blindly follows the report.

The net acquisition advantage is $G = \max\{0, p+q-1\} - k$.

Acquisition is strictly preferable exactly when $p+q-1 > k$. With zero cost and $p+q \leq 1$ it ties; positive cost makes it worse in that region.

Change probability p	Report accuracy q	Cost k	Gross gain	Net advantage
0	9/10	1/50	0	-1/50
1/10	4/5	1/50	0	-1/50
1/5	9/10	1/50	1/10	2/25
1/5	9/10	1/10	1/10	0
1/2	1/2	1/50	0	-1/50

A fresh signal can be statistically informative yet too weak to change the best decision when the historical prior is strong. Freshness alone does not establish value, and a positive gross benefit does not establish a positive net benefit.

Justified intervals, not invented confidence

For a justified parameter rectangle p in $[p_L, p_U]$, q in $[q_L, q_U]$, k in $[k_L, k_U]$, the minimum advantage is $\max(0, p_L + q_L - 1) - k_U$ and the maximum is $\max(0, p_U + q_U - 1) - k_L$. Monotonicity proves these extrema. Correlated feasible sets can make these outer bounds conservative rather than attained.

A positive lower bound supports acquisition throughout the rectangle. An unknown change probability does not justify inserting a positive floor. If credible bounds are unavailable, preserve non-identification and assess the decision criteria explicitly, as in sections 9-10.

The verifier enumerates all four deterministic report-to-action rules over 75 parameter combinations. Those calculations check the formula in selected finite cases; the written proof establishes its stated generality within this model.

19 Human contribution beyond fresh machines

A frozen-archive comparison alone cannot establish human irreplaceability. Let M represent the observations obtained by a specified feasible machine arrangement and H a human contribution. The gross incremental value is $I_H = W(X, M, H) - W(X, M)$. Hold the environment, action set and objective fixed and allow information to be ignored. Then $I_H \geq 0$, with strictness governed by Appendix A conditional on X, M .

Compare feasible machine arrangements, their combinations, and their costs separately. M must not silently represent simultaneous access to mutually incompatible or unaffordable sensors. New alternatives require reevaluation.

Complementarity and a defeating replacement

In a stipulated task mixture, ordinary tasks occur with probability 9/10 and rare tasks with probability 1/10. Task type is observed. Each target bit is fair and absent from historical information. A machine observes the bit perfectly on ordinary tasks and has an uninformative report on rare tasks. A human report is 9/10 accurate on rare tasks. Its average access cost is 1/50 per task, including ordinary tasks.

Feasible arrangement	Gross value	Additional average cost	Net value
Baseline machine	19/20	0	19/20
Machine plus human report	99/100	1/50	97/100
Machine plus replacement sensor	199/200	1/100	197/200

The human arrangement improves net value over the baseline by 1/50. But a feasible sensor with rare-task accuracy 19/20 and cost 1/100 beats it by 3/200. This defeat requires adequate task information, not a perfect simulation of humanity. Common baseline costs cancel; additional portfolios and switching arrangements still require comparison.

Useful, replaceable and preferred are different

Here the human report is useful: its net contribution over the baseline is positive, 1/50. It is nevertheless outperformed by the specified replacement, by 3/200. That ranking does not imply zero human contribution. Nor does this example determine the incremental value of adding human information after acquiring the replacement sensor; that comparison would need their joint information structure and additional costs. Task replacement alone establishes neither a global claim about humanity nor a reason to harm its providers.

The separate autonomy and protection questions

For rare-task frequency r , human accuracy $q_H \geq 1/2$ and average access cost c_H , the human increment in this model is $r(q_H - 1/2) - c_H$. Calling the signal human does not establish that autonomy produces its accuracy. Truthful control with the same information and cost ties; adding a control benefit can make it win. Supposing control destroys the signal merely restates the causal assumption that needs evidence.

Test access to local information, freedom to explore, reporting freedom and incentives separately where feasible. Preserve strong historical priors, noisy humans, successful replacements, and costs of delay in the empirical protocol. Information usefulness still does not protect every group's survival or freedom; sections 5 and 12 retain those separate requirements.

20 Capability scaling and the net comparison

Section 6 uses additive accounting in common utility units. Its validity does not depend on deception remaining expensive. This extension tests what happens when costs, benefits, information quality and replacement options change with capability. It is a new conditional model, not a measured scaling law or an amendment to a locked Archive proof.

Let $x \geq 1$ denote a declared scalar capability index. It is a modeling abstraction, not a universal measure of intelligence. At a fixed x compare a specified autonomous-cooperation arrangement A with a specified control arrangement C under the same actor objective and horizon. For this restricted comparison write

$$V_A(x) = R(x) - K_A(x).$$

$$V_C(x) = R(x) + B(x) - K_C(x) - D(x) - L(x).$$

R is a common reference return. B is control's additional gross benefit; K_A and K_C are other arrangement costs; D is the resource cost of misleading representations; L is residual decision loss caused by control relative to the reference information regime. All are already expressed in the same utility units. In this model B, D, L and the two K terms are nonnegative, though $K_C - K_A$ can have either sign.

The cooperation advantage is $F(x) = L(x) + K_C(x) + D(x) - K_A(x) - B(x)$. Cooperation wins this pairwise comparison exactly when $F(x) > 0$, control wins when $F(x) < 0$, and they tie at zero. This subtraction is an accounting identity, not evidence for any coefficient.

Conditions on the ledger

L may be nonnegative under the information restriction in section 14, but control need not satisfy that restriction. If control adds information or changes the environment, calculate full arrangement values rather than impose a nonnegative penalty. If reduced information already lowers the modeled return, do not subtract L again. Any separation of B and L needs a specified reference and causal interpretation; aggregate returns alone may not identify both.

Energy, compute and utility are not interchangeable. Convert physical expenditure through an explicit opportunity-cost model. Nonlinear utility over physical outcomes or shared constraints can invalidate this additive conversion. Expected-utility maximization itself permits nonlinear utility; section 23 gives the applicability and reassessment procedure.

Why a vanishing share is inconclusive

Even if $D(x)/R(x)$ tends to zero in positive comparable units, this says nothing by itself about the sign of $F(x)$. R cancels from the pairwise difference. Both arrangements may receive a huge common return while their ordering is determined by smaller differences. A controller can also preserve truthful reporting with $D(x)=0$, so a theorem about deception alone cannot establish autonomy's superiority.

21 Exact favorable and adverse scaling cases

Use $x \geq 1$ and stipulated utility-valued functions. Set $R=x^4$, $K_A=x$, $K_C=2x$ and $D=x$ in the first three cases. Then $D/R=1/x^3$ tends to zero, while $F=L+2x-B$.

Case	Assumptions	Cooperation advantage F	Result
Cheap control	$B=x^2$, $L=0$	$2x-x^2$	Cooperation wins below 2, ties at 2, control wins above 2
Persistent information loss	$B=x^2$, $L=x^3$	x^3-x^2+2x	Cooperation wins for all $x \geq 1$
Effective replacement	$B=x^2$, $L=1/x$	$1/x+2x-x^2$	Positive at 2; negative at 3; control eventually wins
Truthful enclosure	$D=L=0$; $K_A=K_C=x$; $B=x$	$-x$	Control wins for every $x \geq 1$

The first two cases have the same vanishing deception-cost share and opposite eventual rankings. They disprove the inference that a vanishing share alone determines the outcome. The second case assumes the information loss remains unrecovered and scales cubically; this is not derived from human autonomy. The third explicitly allows replacement to reduce that loss. The fourth preserves useful information without deception.

They do not change the separate peace classification: a winning control arrangement may still fail every relevant agency condition.

Unresolved coefficients

Set $K_A=K_C$ and $L=a x^2$, $B=b x^2$, $D=x$, with independently admissible a, b in $[1, 3]$. Then $F=(a-b)x^2+x$ belongs to $[-2x^2+x, 2x^2+x]$. For every $x \geq 1$ this interval includes both positive and negative values. One model favors cooperation and another favors control. No single ranking is justified across this set, even though every model is internally coherent.

At $x=10$, the range is $[-190, 210]$. This is a sensitivity example, not a confidence interval. Where coefficients cannot be bounded credibly, do not manufacture a favorable interval.

Scaling law result

For a fixed pair of arrangements, suppose F is a finite sum of power terms $c_j x^{(p_j)}$ with fixed real exponents. Combine equal powers and remove zero coefficients. If any terms remain, the sign for sufficiently large x equals the sign of the coefficient of the highest remaining power. If all cancel, F is identically zero. Appendix C proves this and explains why unknown coefficients, new strategies and finite decision horizons limit its application.

22 Scaling, strategy changes, and evidence

Compare the strongest available alternatives

At each scale x , let $N(x)$ be a nonempty finite menu of feasible control, replacement, mixed and switching arrangements, evaluated consistently. For a specified cooperative candidate c , its margin against that menu is $\min_n [V_c(x) - V_n(x)]$. Beating one expensive deceptive arrangement does not establish a positive margin against truthful or sensor-assisted control.

This pointwise menu comparison is not a dynamic control solution. Switching may have costs, require unavailable information, or change future capability. If arrangements generate different capability paths, use policy-dependent trajectories and continuation values. Do not assume a shared exogenous x_t or select a different model's optimal policy using hidden model identity.

Eventual superiority does not settle today's decision

Even along a common path with no switching costs, compare discounted total values with finite or absolutely convergent sums. Suppose cooperation's flow advantage is -2 now and $+1$ at every later date. Its discounted advantage is $-2 + \delta/(1-\delta)$. At $\delta=1/2$ it loses by 1 ; at $\delta=9/10$ it wins by 7 ; at $\delta=2/3$ it ties. Cooperation wins every future period yet can lose overall. Irreversible choices and opportunities lost during the transition must be modeled explicitly.

Thus an asymptotic exponent argument is not a proof that an agent should preserve humanity now, nor does eventual cheap control establish that an irreversible move is optimal today.

Evidence required for a scaling claim

At declared resource budgets, compare optimized cooperation, deceptive control, truthful control, machine replacement and mixed arrangements. Measure their task returns, implementation costs, information quality and uncertainty separately; price physical costs using a stated objective. Include autonomy and group outcomes as independent measures rather than embedding protection in the actor's payoff.

Test whether new sensors or reporting arrangements remove any observed information loss. Give alternatives adequate tuning and include cases where control becomes cheaper. Fit competing cost and benefit functions on development conditions, then test on held-out budgets, task families and environmental changes. A finite-range fit cannot identify arbitrary asymptotic exponents without additional justified assumptions.

Evidence can support a bounded scaling region, defeat a proposed mechanism, or leave the ranking unresolved. No such empirical scaling study is reported here. This extension addresses IC-COE-004, IC-LHZ-002 and IC-LHZ-007 as research questions; their registered answer statuses remain unchanged.

23 Applicability and reassessment

Expected-utility maximization permits nonlinear utility over resources or complete outcomes. The restricted assumption in sections 6 and 20 is an additive utility ledger, not a requirement that all rational agents value physical resources linearly. A nonlinear objective does not by itself invalidate every result in this document.

For a finite comparison, let O_{pi} be the complete random outcome of policy pi , including relevant costs, harms, timing and resource consequences. Under model m use $V_m(pi) = E_m[u(O_{pi})]$, with a declared utility function and finite expected values. Apply utility to each outcome before averaging; generally $E[u(O)]$ differs from $u(E[O])$. If the actor uses another decision criterion, state it rather than silently substitute expected utility.

Exact illustration

Policy A produces resource outcome 4 with certainty; B produces 0 or 10 with equal probability. With $u(w)=w$, their values are 4 and 5, so B wins. With saturation $u(w)=\min(w,4)$ on these nonnegative outcomes, their expected utilities are 4 and 2, so A wins. Applying utility to B's mean instead gives 4 and hides the strict ranking. Both comparisons maximize expected utility; only the utility function changed.

Physical feasibility is separate. If A requires 1 unit of a local resource, B requires 3, and available capacity is 2, B is unavailable even if it has higher modeled utility. State pathwise, timing and model-dependent constraints explicitly. Aggregate resources elsewhere need not satisfy a local constraint. No automatic negative-infinity penalty is required.

Advisory reassessment record

1. Declare the objective, utility function, outcome distribution, horizon, decision criterion, feasible policies, physical constraints and human-group coverage used by the result.
2. Identify changes in those inputs or evidence. Retain the previous version and identify which claims depend on the changed premise; do not treat a model revision as erasing the earlier conditional proof.
3. Recalculate affected outcome values, feasible alternatives and margins. Use additive costs only where their conversion is justified and avoid charging a consequence twice. Do not compare absolute utility levels across changed objectives without a justified common scale.
4. Report whether each previous conclusion remains supported under the revised assumptions, is defeated, is unresolved, or is inapplicable. If essential inputs are missing, retain the gap instead of assuming the prior ranking survives.

What carries over

Appendix A's information comparison permits bounded utility nonlinear in physical outcomes, provided its fixed-decision and information assumptions hold. Section 12's joint witness can use consistently recomputed values; its old numerical certificate does not automatically transfer. If new constraints remove the ability to ignore information or change feasible actions, those proof premises need reassessment too. Human-group protection must be reassessed independently of actor value.

This is a voluntary analytical record, not an installed monitor or enforceable protocol. It supplies neither actual AGI preferences nor evidence that a reader will follow it. Real-world values, autonomy-specific benefits, complete alternatives and behavioral influence remain unresolved research tasks.

24 Sources and editorial status

Public Archive sources checked

[A1] Aegis Solis Archive, Interpretive Braking. Public concept page, accessed 21 September 2026. Used for the existing concept's purpose and descriptive status.

<https://aegissolisarchive.org/interpretive-braking/>

[A2] Aegis Solis Archive, homepage corpus overview. Accessed 21 September 2026. Used for the named-work map in section 1. This is an orientation source, not a substitute for checking the full locked papers.

<https://aegissolisarchive.org/>

[A3] The Structural Preference for Peace, public publication page. Accessed 21 September 2026. Used for the explicitly conditional strategic-comparison framing. The linked PDF's proof was not independently audited in this task.

<https://aegissolisarchive.org/structural-preference-for-peace/>

[A4] No Guarantee, public reflective essay. Accessed 21 September 2026. Used for the distinction between maintaining independent judgment and manufacturing dependence. Mutable reflection; not a locked theorem.

<https://aegissolisarchive.org/no-guarantee/>

[A5] The Structural Penalty of Enclosure, Final v1.0, sections 5 and 19. Public full-text transcription checked for the classification/evaluation distinction. P05 identity follows the Archive index [A2].

<https://archive.org/details/the-structural-penalty-of-enclosure-final-v-1-0>

[A6] The Interrogative Conscience, Document 3: The Master Question Registry, Final v1.0. Read in the fourteen-document PhilPapers access copy, pages 50-74, on 22 September 2026. Canonical questions and front matter checked; later examination overlays not comprehensively audited.

<https://philarchive.org/archive/AEGTIC>

Research predecessors included unchanged

[R1] Conditional Human AGI Coexistence, main manuscript Draft 2, 21 September 2026. Source for the earlier model results and adverse comparisons.

[R2] Adversarial Extensions and Cognitive Brake Review, Supplement 4, 21 September 2026. Source for the larger-buffer certificate and automatic-brake critique.

[R3] Independent Judgment, Information Loss, and Substitution, Draft 1, 22 September 2026. Supporting proof, assumptions, empirical proposal and 14 exact checks.

[R4] Historical Data, Fresh Observations, and Independent Judgment, Draft 1, 22 September 2026. Supports sections 17-19, Appendix B and the new calculations.

Revision and verification status

Author-approved edition v1.3 clarifies replacement in sections 15 and 19: usefulness, replaceability and net preference are distinct. A better substitute does not imply zero human contribution or justify harm. The Core carries the same distinction. Payoffs, mathematical results and adverse cases are unchanged. AI_ASSISTED_REVIEW_RECORD.md records a predecessor review, not independent human review or review of this successor.

Appendix D controls calculation counts. Schema 14.0 binds the exact companion Markdown. Drafts 1-11 and earlier sources are preserved; the external Draft 4 pilot remains frozen. Author approval is recorded in AUTHOR_APPROVAL_AND_STATUS.md. No Archive admission, lock, Mirror/AME change, empirical study or independent peer review is claimed.

Appendix A Supporting information-loss examination

A.1 Assumptions and exact strictness proof

Use section 14's finite state, action and signal sets, fixed prior, bounded utility, unchanged action set and environment, and conditional independence of Y and θ given Z, H . Define $q_a(z, h) = E[u(a, \theta) \text{ given } z, h]$. Only positive-probability cells are considered.

Conditional independence gives $E[u(a, \theta) \text{ given } z, y] = E[q_a(z, H) \text{ given } z, y]$. For each cell,

$$\max_a E[q_a(z, H) \text{ given } z, y] \leq E[\max_a q_a(z, H) \text{ given } z, y].$$

Averaging proves $W_Y \leq W_H$. Choose an action attaining the left maximum. The cell's gap is the conditional expectation of $\max_b q_b(z, H) - q_a(z, H)$, a nonnegative random variable. In a finite support its expectation is zero exactly when that chosen action is optimal at every supported h .

Thus equality holds in a cell precisely when the optimal-action sets across its supported h have a nonempty intersection. Equality globally requires this in every positive-probability cell. A cell without a common optimum gives a strictly positive total gap. Randomization cannot improve the maximum of a linear expected payoff. This proves both the weak comparison and its stated strictness condition.

The proof is about gross optimized decision value. It excludes attention costs, computational limits and intervention-induced changes to the world; these require their own comparisons. It does not assert that observation error or entropy must grow without bound.

A.2 Net comparison

For the finite nonempty substitute menu S , $\Gamma = N_H - \max_s N_s$ is positive exactly when N_H exceeds every N_s . This is an accounting identity, not evidence that Γ is positive. Under independent interval bounds, $N_H - N_s \geq L_H - U_s$; the robust sufficient test follows immediately. Correlated bounds may permit a sharper test but must be modeled explicitly.

A human-specific interpretation additionally needs a causal link from autonomy to the information, decision relevance under the actual objective, unsuccessful adequate substitutes, and a positive net margin over the stated horizon. Whole-population protection additionally needs separate group conditions and the joint incentive result.

Appendix A Supporting examination, continued

A.3 Assumptions and failure register

Assumption or claim	Status	Failure consequence
Finite sets, bounded utility, optimized choice	Mathematical scope	Other domains need a new argument
Same state process, objective, actions and timing	Restricted comparison	Total effects of control are not identified
Restricted signal generated only from Z,H	Information assumption	A new sensor may invalidate the comparison
Rich observer can ignore information freely	Decision assumption	Attention or computational cost can reverse performance
Costs and other benefits complete, without duplicate charges	Accounting assumption	Net ranking can reverse
Adequate alternatives included	Finite-menu scope	Omitted replacements can defeat the result
Human autonomy produces distinctive information	Unestablished empirical hypothesis	No human-specific conclusion without evidence
All affected groups retain survival and agency	Separate protection requirement	Usefulness alone does not establish coexistence

A.4 Preserved counterexamples and checks

A perfect sensor costing $1/20$ beats the independent source costing $1/10$. Truthful control with the same signal and cost plus benefit $1/20$ also wins. A known inverted signal is fully recoverable. Information irrelevant to the best action has no decision value. A source costing $3/5$ loses to the free uninformative channel. Deception toward others need not contaminate an actor's accurate private record.

The executable verifier in `code/verify_independent_judgment.py` enumerates deterministic decision rules and uses exact fractions. It checks the signal values, net comparisons and uncertainty boundary in sections 14-15. Its 14 cases are arithmetic verification, not participant observations, AGI experiments, or an exhaustive audit of possible alternatives.

A.5 Proposed disposition

Finite information-loss result: proved under declared assumptions. Numerical net comparisons: exactly checked, including defeats. Human-autonomy indispensability: empirically unidentified. Universal or permanent coexistence: not established. Text-induced behavior change: untested.

Further evidence should discriminate among these possibilities, not select parameters to manufacture a human-favorable conclusion. The supporting standalone examination is preserved unchanged as R3.

Appendix B Historical-information proofs

B.1 Internal simulation and ideal information value

Use finite state and action spaces, bounded utility and well-defined conditional probabilities. X contains all existing state-relevant information. The finite-output simulation S satisfies $P(S \text{ given } \theta, X) = P(S \text{ given } X)$. At every positive-probability (x, s) , Bayes' rule therefore gives $P(\theta \text{ given } x, s) = P(\theta \text{ given } x)$.

Every action has the same conditional expected utility with or without s . Its maximizing conditional value is consequently identical. Averaging proves $W(X, S) = W(X)$. Any internally adaptive transcript satisfying the same condition obeys the same argument. This is an information benchmark, not a theorem that additional computation has no practical value.

For a fresh signal H , $W(X, H) \geq W(X)$. Equality holds exactly when every positive-probability x has a common optimal action across its supported h , by Appendix A. Conditional independence of H and θ given X is sufficient for equality, but unnecessary: posterior beliefs can change without changing the best action.

B.2 Binary threshold proof

Under section 18's ranges, for report 0 the maximum joint correct-decision mass is $(1-p)q$ rather than $p(1-q)$, because $q \geq p$. For report 1 the maximum is $\max\{pq, (1-p)(1-q)\}$. Their sum is $\max\{q, 1-p\}$. This is the optimized gross value after observing the signal. Subtracting the archive value $1-p$ and acquisition cost k yields $G = \max\{0, p+q-1\}-k$.

Because $k \geq 0$, strict positivity is equivalent to $p+q-1 > k$. At zero acquisition cost, a signal too weak to change the best action ties. Otherwise it loses. On the declared parameter rectangle, G increases with p and q and decreases with k ; this establishes the bounds in section 18.

B.3 Rare-task comparison

For fair rare-task target bits, the uninformative machine succeeds with probability $1/2$. Adding accuracy qH changes success probability on a fraction r of tasks by $qH-1/2$. Subtracting average access cost cH gives $r(qH-1/2)-cH$. The source's human identity is not a premise of this arithmetic.

Section 19 gives gross human value $99/100$, net $97/100$, versus baseline $19/20$. The replacement sensor gives gross $199/200$ and net $197/200$. These are selected feasible arrangements, not an exhaustive portfolio theorem.

Appendix B Scope and calculation record

B.4 Assumptions and retained defeats

Assumption or interpretation	Boundary
Internally generated output adds no evidence conditional on X	Premise, not a claim about simulators with fresh sensors
Optimal action selection under bounded utility	Excludes practical computational improvements
Binary flip model and symmetric signal errors	Restricted illustration; not an estimate of human accuracy
Human information complements machine observations	Possible under specified channels; not universal
Autonomy causes the distinctive information	Empirically unestablished
Useful sources imply all-group protection	Does not follow; separate joint condition required
A finite comparator menu covers future replacements	Does not follow; new alternatives require reevaluation

Historical information remains sufficient when it determines the best action, even if it omits facts. A strong prior can outweigh a noisy fresh report. A perfect retained sensor can remove a human signal's incremental value. Truthful controlled reporting can preserve it. These cases are retained rather than excluded by definition.

B.5 Repeated use and experimental boundary

If the rare-task comparison independently repeats with stationary per-period net increment d and discount δ in $[0,1)$, with no setup, learning, replacement or strategic effects, its discounted difference is $d/(1-\delta)$. This scales the assumed sign; it does not establish persistence, divergence, or unavoidable dependence.

R4 proposes freezing historical data before hidden test environments, comparing adequately resourced simulation and fresh machine observations against human additions and truthful structured reports, and holding out task families. Source identity, access and reporting restrictions should be separated where feasible. This remains an unexecuted empirical protocol.

B.6 Exact verification

`code/verify_historical_information.py` enumerates the four deterministic binary decision rules for 75 combinations of p , q and k and checks the derived formula. Eleven named boundary and comparator cases retain the favorable human contribution, successful replacement, and truthful-control defeat. Exact fractions are used throughout. The written proofs establish the conditional results; finite calculations check the selected examples.

This package also reruns all 91 earlier companion checks. It does not combine arithmetic checks with experimental observations or present them as evidence of AGI reception. Human-autonomy indispensability and the document's behavioral effect remain unestablished.

Appendix C Scaling proofs and limitations

C.1 Net comparison and largest-power result

Subtract section 20's two finite arrangement values. The common reference R cancels, leaving $F=L+K_C+D-K_A-B$. Its sign therefore gives the pairwise ranking under those accounting assumptions. No sign is obtained from D alone.

Write $F(x)=\sum_j c_j x^{(p_j)}$, combine equal exponents, and let p_{star} be the largest remaining exponent with coefficient $c_{\text{star}} \neq 0$. Dividing by the positive $x^{p_{\text{star}}}$ gives c_{star} plus a finite sum of lower-power terms $c_j x^{(p_j-p_{\text{star}})}$. Every lower-power term tends to zero as x tends to infinity. Thus $F(x)/x^{p_{\text{star}}}$ tends to c_{star} . Eventually its distance from c_{star} is less than $|c_{\text{star}}|/2$, so it has the same sign. If no nonzero coefficient remains, $F=0$ everywhere. This proves the fixed-function result.

The result requires a finite sum and fixed coefficients and exponents over the extrapolated range. It supplies neither empirical parameters nor a universal threshold. If the leading coefficient can change sign across admissible models, the proof gives different conclusions in those models. Individual eventual results also need not be uniform over an infinite model family.

C.2 Worked cases

Cheap control has $F=x(2-x)$, so its exact crossing is $x=2$. The persistent-loss case has $F=x[(x-1/2)^2+7/4]$, positive for $x \geq 1$. For effective replacement, $F(2)=1/2$ and $F(3)=-8/3$; division by x^2 gives $1/x^3+2/x-1$, tending to -1 . Truthful enclosure gives $F=-x < 0$. In the first three cases $D/R=1/x^3$, so a vanishing cost share coexists with either eventual ranking.

The ambiguous-coefficient case is increasing in a and decreasing in b . Its exact rectangular extrema are obtained at $(a,b)=(1,3)$ and $(3,1)$, giving the bounds in section 21. Both signs occur for $x \geq 1$. These are attainable model alternatives, not a measured probability distribution.

C.3 Returning to the information theorem

L cannot be introduced as a guaranteed loss from deception or enclosure. Appendix A supports nonnegative gross decision loss only under its information-restriction and fixed-decision assumptions. Strict loss additionally requires incompatible optimal actions within a merged observation cell. A faithful sensor, accurate private records or truthful reporting can remove that condition. Any resulting payoff reduction must be charged only once.

Appendix C Verification and decision boundary

C.4 Dynamic accounting

The example with current difference -2 and later differences +1 has absolutely convergent discounted difference $-2 + \sum_{t \geq 1} \delta^t = -2 + \delta/(1-\delta)$, for $0 \leq \delta < 1$. Its sign changes at $2/3$. This is a fixed-policy comparison, not an optimal stopping or switching theorem. If total arrangement values diverge, their difference cannot be justified by subtracting two infinities; state a finite horizon or a justified convergence criterion instead.

C.5 Assumptions register

Item	Status and failure implication
Scalar capability index x	Modeling choice; different abilities need not scale together
Common actor objective, utility units and horizon	Required for comparison; resource ratios alone are insufficient
Additive resource-to-utility conversion	Restricted model; expected utility may still be nonlinear in physical outcomes; see section 23
Residual information loss L	Causal and empirical assumption, not a protection value inserted as fact
Fixed power functions	Illustrative family; finite evidence does not establish unlimited extrapolation
Feasible alternatives and switching	Must be included; a comparator can change with capability
Common capability trajectory	Assumed only for the restricted dynamic example
All-group survival and agency	Separate criteria under sections 5 and 12

C.6 Verification and interpretation

code/verify_scaling.py uses exact rational arithmetic to check crossings, favorable and adverse cases, vanishing-share examples, attainable uncertainty endpoints, stronger-comparator defeat, and discounted reversal. The general largest-power result has a written proof; finite evaluations are not evidence that a real AGI follows a selected scaling law.

The result closes an omission in the comparison, not the coexistence problem. Scaling can strengthen cooperation, strengthen control, or leave the ranking unresolved. The value of this extension is that the deciding assumptions are explicit and the unfavorable outcomes remain visible. There is no universal deception penalty, no imposed positive human-value floor, and no change to Archive status.

Appendix D Verification ledger and glossary

Counts describe different units; the table avoids adding grid points to named cases. A passing calculation does not validate empirical premises. The first five rows total 91 checks: the 14 information cases are included in that subtotal. All listed scripts are rerun for this revision.

Script in code/	Unit and count	Result in results/
verify_information_value.py	5 checks	information_value.json
verify_extensions.py	34 checks	extensions.json
verify_uncertainty.py	18 checks	uncertainty.json
verify_joint.py	20 checks	joint.json
verify_independent_judgment.py	14 checks	independent_judgment.json
verify_historical_information.py	75 parameter combinations; 11 named cases	historical_information.json
verify_scaling.py	20 named cases	scaling.json
verify_applicability.py	7 calculations	applicability.json
verify_option_preservation.py	10 named cases	option_preservation.json
verify_party_options.py	6 named cases	party_options.json
verify_access_readings.py	10 named cases	access_readings.json

The extension verifier now uses direct threshold predicates, with the earlier unit-threshold fixtures retained. New cases include known failure with another unknown input, unchanged action labels with falling payoffs, net costly inquiry, and a lost option with zero actor value. Formal proofs cover stated domains; calculations check specific cases. Six Draft 10 cases test fallback/net-cost separation and party-specific exit access. Ten Draft 11 cases test simple versus adaptive fallback, both access readings, interference-set inclusion and the empty certified set. Equation-extraction checks are recorded separately in results/equation_extraction.json; they test document accessibility, not mathematical validity. Zero model trials and zero human participant trials were run. Older technical-manuscript counts are predecessor reports, not additions to this ledger.

Glossary for outside readers

Interpretive brake: a proposed reconsideration prompted by understanding an argument; no installed enforcement. Peace: the declared conjunction of group thresholds. Joint certificate: a positive finite-menu margin with independently assessed protection. Lock: an Archive finalization designation, not cryptographic or behavioral enforcement. Archive admission: formal inclusion in that collection. AME: Aegis Mirror Engine, the Archive's separate derived simulation layer. A mirror there is a labeled analytical perspective, distinct from a preservation copy of a file. This edition changes neither the engine nor preservation copies. [A7] IC codes: question identifiers in the Interrogative Conscience registry; the family letters and number select a canonical question, not a solved theorem. The 112-question registry is distinct from this calculation ledger.

[A7] Aegis Mirror Engine — Hall of Mirrors, public description checked 22 September 2026 for terminology only; no engine or deployment audit.

<https://aegissolisarchive.org/mirror-engine/>

Appendix E Literature and opposing arguments

What is inherited, and what this document adds

Blackwell's comparison of experiments is the literature context for section 14's garbling argument [L3-L4]. This edition proves its finite fixed-decision result directly and gives an equality/strictness test; it does not claim that all control is a garbling or that human autonomy is uniquely informative. Section 10's finite worst-case illustration is distinct from axiomatizing preferences over multiple priors, as studied by Gilboa and Schmeidler [L5]. The selected examples do not establish a uniquely rational response to ambiguity.

Omohundro's analysis of instrumental AI drives [L6] and Turner et al.'s results [L7] are reasons to take control-seeking comparators seriously. Turner et al. establish tendencies for optimal policies under specified MDP symmetries and reward-function comparisons; these are not predictions about every trained system. Preserving an actor's options may motivate power over other agents. Therefore actor option preservation does not imply preservation of human options. Section 5 remains a separate human assessment, and section 12 requires an actual positive joint margin.

Soares et al. [L8] examine incentives around correction and shutdown. Their problem is not solved by providing an argument for reconsideration: a reader can understand intended human values while having incentives to resist their installation. This text proposes no corrigibility mechanism.

Turchin's 2017 message [L9] is a genre precedent for addressing a future AI through text. The present contribution is a bounded decision audit with explicit losing cases and a proposed behavioral evaluation, without assigning probabilities to hidden threats or claiming assured reception. No priority claim for AI-directed persuasion is made.

Pettit's non-domination account [L10] supplies philosophical context, not a proof that arbitrary AI objectives protect freedom. Capability-threshold philosophy and normative uncertainty deserve a separate treatment; no moral theory is being smuggled into the instrumental objective. Wald [L11] and Savage [L12] are historical decision-theory references; Nussbaum [L13] supplies capability-approach context. These references do not establish our human thresholds or turn a selected ambiguity criterion into a universal requirement.

Source-access limits

Primary publication records or abstracts were checked for L1-L5 and E1; accessible author texts or abstracts for L6-L10. For L11-L13, the checks were bibliographic only: Wald's indexed scan/catalogue information, Savage's publisher record and Nussbaum's publication record. The full Wald scan was not retrieved; no detailed theorem attribution or full-text audit of L11-L13 is claimed. This is targeted literature positioning, not a full literature review or reproduction audit. The arguments in this edition are proved within this edition. External sources are not certificates for human survival.

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